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Summary :
This study used coalitions as a model for organizations, and leaving
a coalition as a model of career mobility. The effects of defection, from
the point of view of the defector and the non-defectors, were investigated
using a number of behavioral measures. Results indicated that defection
from stable coalitions in the four coalition games studied here led to a
reduction in benefits for both the defector and the non-defectors. Defectors
operationally defined as traitors fared more poorly than non-traitorous
defectors, particularly in the long run. And relative power, over all
conditions, led to significantly more positive outcomes than relative
equality or weakness. Other uses of coalitions as models of organizational
behavior are discussed.
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Managers are often faced with difficult decisions. Although often
constrained by time, rules, and regulations, managers nevertheless have
a variety of options to choose from in making these decisions. One type
of decision that talented managers may frequently face, particularly if
success can easily be attributed to their individual behaviors, concerns
"loyalty" to the current organization. Even in the worst of times, ob-
viously talented individuals are continuously in demand. Thus, they will
often be faced with a variety of career options, only one of which may be
continuing with the same firm. In highly competitive organizational
systems, where success is based on the abilities of the labor force (e.g.,
advertising agencies, television networks, etc.), the choice between
staying or leaving to work with a competitor can be construed as a choice
between serving individualistic or group-oriented goals. Staying with
one's current organization often results in fewer personal gains, but
greater benefits for the organization. Leaving to work with a competitor
often results in increased individual gain. The dilemma is one that is
typical of large groups (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965).
If the organization is viewed as a coalition (Cyert and March, 1963;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the individuals who change organizations can
be viewed as defectors. This paper focuses on the effects of defection,
and utilizes four different coalition games to model competitive systems
where individuals' resources are important determinants of success.
Coalition games are models of n-person mixed-motive conflict situa-
tions. Formation of a coalition requires cooperation among coalition
members, but almost always has strong elements of competition when all
the individuals playing the game cannot be included in the same coalition.
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Thus, there is competition for inclusion. In addition, there is com-
petition within the coalition to determine how the coalition's payoff
will be divided among its members. Coalition games, then, might be
viewed as models of systems of organization, with coalitions being models
of organisations. This research uses coalitions as models of organizations,
and investigates the effects of defection on the defector and on the
remaining members of the coalition. In addition, where Castore and
Murnighan (1978) investigated the determinants of individualistic rather
than group-oriented behavior, the present research studies the consequences
of defection (i.e., one type of individualistic behavior).
Defection from a coalition is simply a departure by one coalition
member to join another coalition. Because research on coalitions (see
Murnighan, 1978, for a review) has repeatedly found that minimum winning
coalitions (i.e., coalitions where the departure of any member renders
them no longer winning) tend to form almost to the exclusion of all
others, defection becomes a real threat for current coalitions. Such
devastating effects are less likely in large organizations, which can
often survive after the departure of one Gf its members. However, the
disruption that a defection can cause, particularly if it means movement
by key personnel from one's own organization to a competitor's organiza-
tion, is not unimportant. By way of example, the severity of such threats
is readily apparent when the owners of professional football teams follow
the common practice of changing the locks on their organization's head-
quarters prior to a head coach's departure to work for another team.
Just as defection is a threat to coalitions, Kail (1976) has noted
that mobility, from one organization to its competitor, is a threat to
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organizations. Jennings (1971) has persuasively argued that the mobile
manager is valued. However, such an individual is particularly valued by
the organisation s/he joins , rather than by the organization s/he leaves .
Jennings also implies that potentially successful individuals will
reach success more quickly by moving. In coalition terms, the defector
would be predicted to gain by his/her defection. The present study tests
this hypo thesis
s
by evaluating the effects of defection both on the defector
and on. the members of the prior coalition. In addition, models of coali-
tion behavior are used to predict when defection will be effective for the
defector, and when defection will be successfully endured by previous
coalition partners*
In differentiating between effective and ineffective defections,
(for both the defector and his/her previous partners) , coalition models
have stressed the importance of the individual's current payoffs, the
payoffs that other coalitions offer and the relationship between the two.
For instance, consider the simplest coalition situation, where any two
of three individuals can form a winning coalition, and where individuals
A and B have formed a stable coalition. If individual B succumbs to
temptation and forms a coalition with player C, the short-run outcomes
are positive for players E and C and negative for player A. However,
if player B has taken a very high payoff for defecting, s/he becomes
vulnerable. Coalition models (eg., Aumann and Maschler
s 1964; Korcorita
and Chertkoff, 1974) point out that individual C may be inclined to
defect from the BG coalition and form a coalition with A, excluding indi-
vidual B entirely. This situation might be labelled the "Judas Iscariot
Phenomenon", with player B in the title role. Player B has betrayed a
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stable coalition partner, A s and, having fulfilled C's purpose of breaking
up the AB coalition, is no longer so valuable to C. That both A and C
will be less inclined to deal with B in the long run, then, is not surprising.
Komorita and Cbertkoff (1973) have formally defined the conditions
when payoffs are "extremely high", calling them non-viable . A non-viable
payoff is one that exceeds one's best possible payoff, as determined either
by the equality norm (i.e., everyone should share the payoff equally) or by
the equity norm (i.e., payoffs should be proportional to an individual's
resources). For instance, one of the coalition games used in this study
assigned resources to the players, in terms of votes, where player A re-
ceived 10 votes, B received 7 votes, C 5 votes, D 3 votes, and E 2 votes.
A winning coalition had to obtain a majority of the votes (14). (This
game can be depicted as 14(10-7-5-3-2), where the first number indicates
the number of votes needed to win, and the subsequent numbers indicate
the votes assigned to the players*) In this situation, if players A and
C have foimed a winning coalition (their votes total 15) and player A
defects to form a coalition with player B s his payoffs will be considered
viable if they do not exceed a payoff of 66.67%. This figure is determined
by the fact that, in either the AC or ADE coalition, player A contributes
10 of the 15 votes controlled by the coalition. Equity, where payoffs are
proportional to resources, dictates a payoff of 66.67%; application of the
equality norm or the equity norm to other coalitions results in a lower
payoff for A. Thus, Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) define payoffs over
66.67% as non-viable, and predict that they will result in player A being
vulnerable to subsequent exclusion. Alternatively, if player C defected
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from the AC coalition to form a coalition with players B and E, his/her
payoffs would be judged as to their viability on the basis of the best
payoff received when invoking the equality norm. In this instance, in a
coalition with B and E, player C contributes 5 of 14 votes. Equity would
yield a payoff of 35.71%. Application of the equity norm to any other
the
coalition yields C even lower payoffs. However, the use of equality norm
in a coalition with player A yields an equal split of 50%. Thus, 50% bece
player C's best possible payoff; if s/he defects for more than 50% of the
payoff (i.e., accepting a non-viable payoff) player C should also be
vulnerable to potential long-run exclusion.
To better illustrate this notion of viable and non-viable payoffs,
consider a situation where an individual works for a small company in a
competitive labor-intense industry. A competitor wi thin the industry
offers him/her a position in their company with a significantly higher
salary, increased prestige, more autcnomoy. etc. The individual's first
joyful response might be, "This is too good to be true!" Coalition models
would tell this individual to take that statement literally; it is too
good to be true. Such prosperity should not be expected to last. A more
specific example of just this type of situation has also been popularised
by espionage novels: The noted scientist who defects to obtain a much bett .
.
situation finds, after doing so, that the grass is not so green on the other
side, especially after he has no more secrets to offer. Thus, according t
the coalition models, the effectiveness of defection for an individual may
depend on the viability of the offer s/he accepts.
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Factors other than viability, however > might also influence the
effectiveness of defection* For Instance, if the entire system is tem-
porary and will soon be dissolving (in €aplcw*s (1964) terms, a terminal
situation), defecting for a non-viable (and very high) payoff immediately
prior to the end of an interaction becomes an excellent strategy. Thus,
the timing of defection becomes important. In addition, defecting from
a stable coalition for a very high payoff may also be effective if the
defector is dealing with unsophisticated players who do not have the skill
required to effectively exclude him/her in subsequent interactions.
To allow for a test of this last notion, the participants in this
study played each of four games, increasing their bargaining sophistication
with each game, This is not unlike "real world" bargaining interactions:
On one's first trip to a Mexican or Turkish bazaar, an individual often
lacks many of the skills needed to get the best bargain. In the coalition
games in this study, such inexperience, even though it might be a character-
istic of the defector as well as the other players
;
should have augmented
the payoffs a defector could subsequently obtain. In addition, each of the
games was "terminal", allowing for comparisons between defectors taking
non-viable payoffs immediately prior to termination and defectors leaving
earlier, considerably prior to termination.
Three factors, then, have been highlighted as possibly determining
the effectiveness of defection: The viability of the defector's payoff,
the timing of defection, and the sophistication of the players. Indeed,
it might be predicted that unless an individual violates all of these
conditions, s/he may gain from defecting, For instance, taking a non-
viable payoff late in the game is advantageous to the defector, as is
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taking a non-viable payoff early in the game from unsophisticated players
However, taking a non-viable payoff early in the game from sophisticated
players, players who have the ability to exclude the defector from sub-
sequent coalitions, may be opening the door for disaster. Indeed, in
these situations, the defector might be labelled a traitor : S/he has
taken a large payoff, more than s/he should expect, thus alienating both
previous and subsequent coalition psrtner(s) . In the five-person games
studied here, few unof fended players will remain. And when trust has bee
broken, it is difficult to reestablish (c£. s Gamson, 1967; Murnighan and
Leung, 1976; Rapoport and Chammah, 1966; Roth and Murnighan, 1978).
One additional variable may also be important* Individuals in very
powerful positions may be able to reassert themselves following their
defection, even if they have defected from sophisticated players for an
early, non-viable payoff. Hall (1976), for instance, proposes a relation-
ship between career options sxid influence: "The more career options you
have, ...the more influence you have within the system (p. 186) " This
paper takes a similar point of view: While additional options may be the
basis for an individuals power, an individual with power also will tend
to have many available options. We are suggesting, then, a mutually
casual relationship between power and available alternatives.
Coalition models (particularly Shapley's (1953) value model and
Komorlta ! s (1974) weighted probab5.1ity model) have formally analyzed
the power of the players In coalition games. For instance, in the
14(10-7*-5-3-2) game mentioned above, player A is attributed with more
power than players B and C, who in turn are attributed with more power
than players D and E. This increased power is based on the player f s
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greater potential to turn non-winning coalitions into winning coalitions
or on a player's ability to form a greater number of small winning coali-
tions.
The four games in. this study, therefore, were designed to establish
four different power structures among the players, von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) have shown that there are only four five-person games
that (1) have a constant payoff to winning coalitions (i.e., simple games),
(2) do not include a dictator (i.e., a player who can obtain the entire
payoff by him/herself, without the necessity of forming a coalition) or
a veto player (i.e., one who must be included in every winning coalition),
and (3) realistically involve all the players (in their terms, all players
are essential), The four games studied here are examples of these four
possibilities. The power relationship among the players is exemplified
by the players strategic positions, which is based on the winning coalitions
that can form. For instance, if two five-person games with different re-
source distributions (eg., 14(10-7-5-4-2) and 10(6-5-4-3-2)) yield the same
set of winning coalitions (eg., AB, AC, BCF, BCD, any three-player coaiitior
that includes A, and any four- or five-player coalition), then they are
considered to be identical, and the strategic positions of each of the
players in the respective positions are also identical. Following von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the strategic positions of the players are
classifications of the power of the players (on an ordinal scale within
a game) where the weakest players receive one vote, and each player with
additional power receives as few additional votes as is necessary to depict
the game. Thus, the strategic positions of the players in the above two
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examples is depicted by 5(3-2-2-1-1), Notice that the winning coalitions
for the examples and for their strategic depictions are identical. Table 1
displays the four games used in this study and their strategic representations
Insert Table 1 about here.
along with each player's maximum viable payoff and the minimum winning
coalitions. From the strategic representations, it is clear that each game
represented a different power structure.
In considering the effects of a powerful position following a
defection, one's power relative to the other players in the game may be
the most important determinant of an individual's ability to reassert
him/herself after defecting. Even if one is powerful, if there is another
powerful player in the game, defecting is a greater risk than if other
players as powerful as oneself are not present. Thus, in the
27(15-14-10-8-5) game, players A and B are powerful (one of them must be
included in the winning coalition); but should either of them decide to
defect from a stable coalition, s/he must deal with the other, who poses
a considerable threat to his/her subsequent payoffs and coalition inclu-
sions. Players in the A position in either the 14(10-7-5-3-2) or the
30(24-9-8-7-6) games are not faced with such potent threats. Thus, the
relative power of a player in these games is predicted to be positively
related to his/her effectiveness as a defector.
This discussion has highlighted the potential importance of several
variables on the effectiveness of defection* From the defector's point of
view, defection should lead to increased outcomes (in terms of payoffs and
subsequent inclusions in winning coalitions) if the defector takes non-
viable payoffs, if the defector is not a traitor, and if the defector is
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relatively powerful* Directly relating these hypotheses to the other members
of the previously stable coalitions i.e., non-defectors, they should endure
a defection more successfully if they are deserted by a traitor or if they
are relatively powerful. In addition, non-defectors who had been receiving
non-viable payoffs prior to the dissolution of their stable coalition should
do worse subsequently than non-defectors who had been receiving viable payoffs
Rationale for this hypothesis parallels the earlier notion that alienation
among the other players may increase when one receives non-viable payoffs.
In addition, after receiving non-viable payoffs for several trials, a player
may find it difficult to make offers to others that are tempting enough to
gain re-entry into a new coalition. In other words, one's aspirations (cf
.
,
lewin, Bembo, Festinger, and Sears, 1944; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) may
rise with success.
Finally, following Jennings (1971), defectors are predicted to be
more successful following defection than they would have been without
defecting. A corollary to this prediction is that defectors will be
more successful than non-defectors. In summary, the following hypotheses
were proposed:
(i) Defectors taking non-viable payoffs will fare poorly in
the long run, compared with defectors who take viable
payoffs.
(2) Traitors will fare poorly, compared with non-traitors.
(3) Relatively powerful players, defectors or non-defectors*
will fare better than relatively weak players.
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(4) Non-defectors who have been deserted by a traitor
will fare better than non-defectors deserted by
non-traitorse
(5) Non-defectors who have been receiving non-viable
payoffs will fare worse than non-defectors who have
been receiving viable payoffs.
(6) Defectors will benefit from defecting.
(7) Defectors will fare better than non-defectors after their
departure.
Method
Participants . The participants were 200 advanced undergraduate and
graduate students, I ?0 males and 30 females, enrolled in either a behavioral
science or a group processes course in a commerce department. To complete
the project requirement in the course, students had a choice between writing
a library research paper or participating in the bargaining exercises and
completing a paper analyzing their own strategies in each of the games.
The performance in either option accounted for 10-20% of the grade in the
course. Students who participated in the bargaining exercises were informed
that their performance in the games would be compared to the performance of
other students in the same positions as themselves (eg., all B's in the
14(10-7-3-2) game would be compared with one another). Those scoring better
than the average total points for their position would assure themselves of
an "A" for that portion of the project (although they were also required to
complete the paper); those scoring less than the average could still receive
an "A" by doing an excellent job analyzing their strategies in the paper.
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Only with a relatively poor paper and below average performance in the games
would a student earn a "3" for the project.
Each of the 40 groups played each of the four games in one of the
24 different orders that were possible; each of these 24 were represented
at least once in the sample. Each game was played for a total of 12 trials,
where a trial was defined as the formation of a winning coalition.
Procedure . The participants were given general instructions about
the coalition games in the class prior to the first session. Several
examples of the use of the procedure (in games not used later) were dis-
cussed. The players were told that there would be 12 trials (where a
trial was determined by the formation of a winning coalition) in each
game, and on each trial, the winning coalition would divide a prize of
100 points among its members* They were instructed to do as well as
they could (i.e., maximize their points) because their performance would
and did determine part of their course grade.
Students were randomly assigned to groups, with the constraint that
members be unacquainted. Each group met for its sessions at the same hour
each week for four weeks. The players were told which game they would
be playing each week, but not which position they would hold throughout
each game. Participants were told that they would be in at least one
strong position and at least one weak position in each of the games. They
were allowed to discuss the games with other members of their class, exclu-
ding members of their own group. In addition, the players were encouraged
to formulate strategies for each postion prior to each garne^
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During the games, the players were seated around a set of opaque
partitions that shielded then-! from view of each other and the experimenter.
At each group's first session, the experimenter read specific instructions
about the procedures for the gauges. During the gair.es> the players exchanged
offers on each trial by means of written "offer slips", which required
indicating to whom one wished to send his/her offer and a proposal regarding
the division of rewards for the prospective coalition members. For
example, if player X wished to form an XY coaiiltion, s/he addressed an
offer to player Y and specified a division of the rewards (e.g., 60 for X
and 40 for Y) on the offer slip. A player was required to send an offer
slip to each player included in the proposed coalition. Thus, if a player
proposed a three-person coalition, two offer slips were sent, one to each
of the proposed coalition partners. Players were also told that the
two offer slips must be identical with regard to the proposed division
of rewards; for example, a player could not send an offer to one person
to form one coalition and s second different offer to another person to
form another coalition. After the players had completed the offers,
the experimenter collected, examined, and distributed them to the
proper persons.
After receiving an offer, each person could accept or reject it by
marking "Accept" or "Reject" at the bottom of each offer slip. Players
receiving more than one offer could accept at most one offer, unless the
offers proposed the identical payoff division for the same coalition.
Hence, each person could only accept offers to form a single coalition
on each trial. Furthermore, in determining a winning coalition, any
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player's proposal, if accepted, had priority over any offer he might accept
thus committing a player to his/her own offer- After the offers had been
accepted or rejected, the experimenter collected the offer slips and
announced the winning coalition, if one had formed. A coalition was
declared the winning one if all the proposed coalition partners accepted
the offer* If no coalition formed because at least one person rejected
each of the proposed coalitions, the procedure was repeated until one
had formed successfully. This procedure allowed for acceptance within the
group of two or three proposals on the same trial. For instance; if A
sent an offer to C> B sent an offer to A, and both offers were accepted,
AC would be declared the winning coalition because A was committed to
his/her offer (invalidating his/her acceptance), While the offer D sent
to A did not result in a coalition, it indicated the exact nature (i.e.,
how much s/he was willing to offer) of D ! s interest. If three coalitions
formed in this manner, with each being invalidated by another, the
players were informed of the situation and the trial was rerun.
A practice trial was conducted before the start of the first session.
Immediately after the practice trial, the players were assigned to their
positions for that game. lists of the resources (i.e., votes) for each
position and the set of winning coalitions were also provided. No verbal
communication was permitted thereafter; hence, the players could not
identify each others' positions once the session had begun.
The instructions were summarized for the players at the start of
their second, third 5 and fourth sessions. Practice trials were not run,
but assignment to one of the five positions and information about the
resources for each of the positions and the set of winning coalitions were
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distributed after the. players were seated behind the partitions. Thus,
for each game, the players were not informed of the identity of the players
in the other positions.
Lengthy discussions of the games that included explicit debriefing
about hypotheses in the study were conducted approximately four weeks
after the data collection was completed.
Qperationalizations . Stable coal it lens were operationally defined
as coalitions with the sarae members for three or more consecutive trials.
Thus 5 if players A, D 3 and E formed coalitions an trials 3, 4, and 5 (or
longer) the ADE coalition was stable. A defector from this coalition was
defined as the common ssember in a stable coalition and the coaiitiGn that
formed in the first trial following its breakup, Thus, if on trial 6
an AE coalition formed, then player A was viewed as a defector. Players
D and E in. this example were defined to be non-defectors. Traitors were
defined as defectors who took a non-viable payoff (i.e., one that was
larger than the best offer they could expect; that is, the maximum viable
payoff, according to Komorita and Chertkoff's bargaining theory) early
in the game (prior to the tenth of the twelve trials) from sophisticated
players (in the second, third or fourth session the group played). The
players were assumed to be sophisticated, then, after their first session
and were assumed to expect defection late in the game, removing the
"traitor" stigma from those who defected late. Non-traitors were defectors
who took a viable payoff, defected on the tenth or eleventh trial, or
defected in the first session. Relative power was defined by the players'
strategic positions in relation to other strategic positions for that game*

Relative I y powerful players, those who were more powerful than any other
player in the game, were player A's in the 30(24-9-6-7-6) and the
14(10-7-5-3-2) games* relatively equal players were players A and B in the
27(15-14-10-8*5-) game and all the players in the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game; rela-
tiveiv weak players included plavers B. C. D, arid E in the 30(24—-9-8-7-6)
in i r -- -.- * J " s j
and 14(10-7-3-3-2) games and players C, B, and E in the 27(15-14-10-8-5)
game. None of these concepts were mentioned to the participants during the
course of the experiment.
Dependent Variables , A number of dependent variables pertaining to
the player's payoffs, offers received, and inclusion in winning coalitions
were examined, Pre-defection payoffs and offers received refer to out-
comes in stable coalition trials prior to the defection trial. Post-
defection payoffs and offers received include the defection trial and all
subsequent trials * long-run payoffs and offers received are averaged
over ail trials after but not including the defection trial. Similarly,
the proportion of post-defection coalition inclusions does not include
the defection trial.
Fesul t
s
2
In the forty groups and 155 games played, a total of 166 stable
coalitions formed. Thus, more than a single coalition formed in several
games. Of these 166 stable coalitions, 35 (21%) continued through the
terminal, 12th trial* Because no defection occurred in these instances,
these data could not be included in the analyses. In the 131 stable coali-
tions included in the sample, there were 137 defectors: In six instances,
two players simultaneously defected from the coalition. Finally, due to
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the common occurrence of stable coalitions of three players, there were a
total of 179 non-defectors.
The basic design for analysis was a two (traitor/non-traitor) by three
(relative power: strong, equal, weak) by two (defector/ncn-defector) com-
pletely crossed between subjects factorial . Cell sixes showed considerable
variation. In particular, there were few relatively strong players who
were non-defectors in a stable coalition that was abandoned by a traitor,
Because this low frequency may be s direct reflection of the independent
variables, least squares analyses of variance were used. The results
revealed no significant three-way interactions; therefore, the cell sizes
in the two-way interactions were large enough to quell any interpretation
problems caused by the inconsistent cell sizes.
Prior to analyzing the data with traitor/non-traitor as one of the
independent variables, a similar three-way analysis of variance was con-
ducted with viable/non-viabte payoffs for the defector as the first inde-
pendent variable* The traitor variable incorporated non-viable payoffs
as one condition for being a traitor, and the preliminary analysis was
conducted to insure that the additional elements in the determination of
a traitor (i.e., defecting early from sophisticated players) were impor-
tant in determining the results of defection (and to test the first hypo-
thesis). Although the results of the viable by relative power by defector
analyses were generally in the same direction as the results in the traitor
by relative power by defector analyses, the effects (and the differences
between means) were noticably smaller.
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Defectors who took viable payoffs received long run mean payoffs that
were almost identical (34.3 vs, 35.3; _t(119> < 1. ns) to those received
by defectors who took non-viable payoffs. However, viable defectors
received more long run offers (means of 2.22 and 1.78, Jt(119) - 2*82,
p < .006, two-tailed) and were included in somewhat more winning coali-
tions (mean proportions of .735 and ,588, j^(119) = 1*15, ns) than defectors
who took non-viable payoffs. Thus hypothesis 1 received mixed support.
Because the traitor by relative power by defector anova revealed
several significant effects for mean payoff and mean number of offers
received prior to defection (see Tables 3 S 4 9 and 5), an analysis of
covariance was used, with previous payoffs as a covariate for the payoff
variables and previous offers as a covariate for the offers variables.
There were almost no differences between the covariance and variance
3
analyses „ Thus, because they are simpler 5 the least squares anova
s
will be discussed.
A large number of effects reached standard significance lex-els
in the traitor by relative power by defector analyses. The significant
main effects will be reported first s followed by the significant inter-
actions. References to the hypotheses will be made as each relevant
test is presented. No significant main effects were found for traitor/
non-traitor or for interactions between traitor/non-traitor and relative
power (except for pre-defection payoffs). The major results are summarized
in Tables 2 S 3, 4, and 5.
Insert Tables 2 5 3 S 4, and 5
About Here
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A summary of the main effects for relative power for offers received
is displayed In Table 2* Relatively equal and weak players received
somewhat more offers than the relatively strong players on the defection
trial and prior to defection. However, after defection, particularly in
the long run, relatively strong players received more offers. Post-defection
trials may have been characterized by increased competition among the
players, in which case it is appropriate to approach the relatively strong
individual, who can single-handedly alleviate the "crisis" (if s/he wishes),
The significant effect for post-defection inclusion acts almost as a
manipulation check of relative power, reinforcing the notion that relatively
powerful players do form more coalitions than relatively equal players,
who in turn are included more than relatively weak players.
The main effects for relative power for the payoff variables can
be easily observed in the means in Table 4. Relatively strong players
received significantly larger pre-defection, post-defection, and long run
payoffs than relatively equal or relatively weak players, (The F~ratios
in each case exceeded 41.89,
_£ < .001.) Hypothesis 3, then, receives
strong support.
The main effects for defector are shown in Table 3. Prior to the
defection trial, defectors were receiving higher payoffs and more offers
than non-defectors. This result suggests that prosperity may have led
to defection. Clearly, the defectors received more offers on the defection
trial, and obtained higher payoffs and more offers after the stable coalition
had b&e-n broken up. While long run payoffs also were better for the defectors,
long run offers and post-defection inclusion did not yield significant advan-
tages for the defector* This result suggests the possibility that, as the
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trials continued j the defector may have been losing his/her dominant position,
In particular, though, it is noteworthy that post-defection and long run
payoffs and offers were less than pre-defection payoffs and offers for both
defectors and non-defectors. Yielding to the tesiptation to defect appears
to have clear negative consequences compared with the outcomes obtained in
a stable coalition* Thus, hypothesis 6 is not supported, while hypothesis
7 receives some support, although the continued superiority of defectors
may be questionable*
Relative power by defector interactions were significant for each
of the payoff variables (see Table 4), The lone main effect for pre-
defection payoffs for defectors is accounted for almost completely by the
differences in payoffs for the relatively strong defectors versus the
relatively strong non-defectors* Post-defection payoffs highlight the
superiority of the defector: If a defection is going to occur, it pays
to be the defector. From the point of view of the defector, then,
defection is better than non-defection, supporting hypothesis 7. From
the non-defectors viewpoint, however, relatively equal players did as
well in the long term as did the defectors. This was not the case for
the relatively powerful players, who continued to hold a significant
advantage over non-defectors.
Several interactions between traitor and defector were significant
(see Table 5), The results for the three payoff variables are suggestive
of increasing fortunes for non-defectors who have had to deal with a
traitor. In particular, such non-defector's payoffs approached the long
run payoffs of traitorous defectors, thus yielding some (not significant)
support for hypotheses 2 dnd 4.
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Stronger effects In these interactions were found for the offers
variables, Whereas traitors received somewhat more offers on the
defection trial and prior to defection, their post-defection offers,
particularly in the long run, were significantly fewer than non-
traitorous defectors* Also, non-defectors faced with a traitor received
considerably more offers after defection than non-defectors faced with
a non-traitor. This effect also reversed the pre-defection trend.
Finally, it is noteworthy that non-defectors faced with a traitor
received significantly more long run offers than traitors, and were
also included in more (not significantly) winning coalitions after
defection than traitors. These findings again support hypothesis 4.
Finally, hypothesis 5 was not supported. Non-defectors who had
been receiving non-viable payoffs had long run payoffs, offers, and
inclusions that were not significantly different <_t < I in each
case) frcra those of non-defectors who had been receiving viable payoffs.
Discussion
Seven hypotheses were presented; several dependent variables
were utilized to test these hypotheses, Two perspectives vera used to
evaluate the results, one from the point of view of the defector and
one from the point cf view of the non-defector.
It is interesting to note that the strongest support for the
hypotheses was provided by the offers and inclusions variables rather
than by payoffs. Even though the games In this study continued for
twelve trials, there could be, at most;, nine post-defection trials.
Typically, there were less than nine. Thus, the decreasing trend in

defectors 1 offers and inclusions, if one assumes that offers and
inclusions are necessary for obtaining payoffs, anight not have had
long enough to affect the defectors' payoffs. Future research, then,
might use more trials to augment the suggestive findings in this study,
The comparison between the results for defectors versus non-defectors
yielded fairly strong evidence that, at least in these situations, defectors
did better than non-defectors. The irony of this result, and the most
striking result in this study, is that both defectors and non-defectors
do worse after defection than they had been doing prior to the defection*
In these games > the winners after defection were the players who had been
excluded from the stable coalition. Jennings' hypothesis, at least in this
study, was not supported, even for the relatively strong. This suggests the
possibility that the factors which lead to mobility may also be influential
in reaching success, The differentiation of the effects of factors leading
to mobility and the effects of mobility by itself offers a difficult challenge
to future researchers.
For a player who is a member of the stable coalition, the prospect of
defection offers a clear case of an approach-avoidance conflict (Lev.?in ; 1951).
Continuing the stable coalition is the best for everyone included, hut if
someone is going to defect, it pays to be the defector, Again, it is ironic
that players may learn not only that stable coalitions are effective in
obtaining higher payoffs, more offers* and consistent inclusions, hut also
that being the defector is better than being the non-defector. The
present research also documents the fact that defecting as a traitor is
less effective, especially in the Jong run, than defecting as a non~traitor
*
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The application of these results to career mobility appear to say that
career immobility is best, both for the potential defector and for his/her
organisation. However, the Intense competition that resulted in the coalition
games in this study may not be representative of all or even most organiza-
tional systems. However, in extremely competitive* fest-paced industries,
the defection of a key employee may be disfunctions] for the defector and
,
at least in the short term, for the defector's previous company* Further
research in less competitive atmospheres is necessary to establish the
generality of the present results.
This study attempted to highlight one facet of coalition bargainingj
defectionj that has clear organisational implications* As Weick and Penner
(1966) persuasively argued, the dynamics of coalition bargaining can be
excellent, analogies for organizational interactions. Indeed, the com-
plexities of n-person coalition situations have the potential to offer
greater opportunities for modeling the diversities of organizational
interactions than the more prevalent research on two-person bargaining.
This study pursued but one area of coalition bargaining relevant to organi-
zations. Other research might fruitfully investigate the use of threats
when one is vulnerable to competing coalitions, responses to exclusion,
intercoalition bargaining, etc. As Weick and Penner (1966) noted, coali-
tion research (triads in their paper) "afford an excellent model for the
investigation of organizational phenomena (p. 192)". Research on larger
groups, with their potential fGr even more complex interactions, may provide
even better models than triads (cf, , Murnishan, Komorita, and Szwajkowski
,
1977).
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Table 2
Susaaary of Main Effects
For Relative Power on Offers
Relative ?;>ver
Mean Pre~Defectio3
Offers
Offers on the
Defection Trial
strong Equal weak
2 . 39
.93 2,24 2.28
cf
2,50 2.59 ! .07 2*304 ns
,-iV 2.304 ns
Mean Post-
Defection Offers 2.02 1.9? 1*81 1,60 2,304 ns
Mean Long-
Run Offers 2. OS
ft
Proportion of Post-
Defection Inclusions ,817
1,85 . 1.62, 3.5S 2,288 .03
~<:j
.579. ,437 10.17 2,288 .00]
ti c
Note : Means in each cell are unweighted* Mesas sharing a common subscript
within a Bain effect are not significantly different from one another
at the .05 leve3 using the Newaan-Keuls procedure.
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Footnotes
1» I>ue to scheduling difficulties, six groups missed one session and
completed the gataes in five weeks. Two groups also participated
in two games the ssaae day,
2* Technical difficulties led to errors in the conduct of five sessions.
The play in these gsmes could not be analysed*
3. Multivariate analyses of variance were not used because, even though
the dependent variables were intercorreiated , rhe evaluation of
effectiveness froirs the perspectives of the defector and the non-
defectors necessitated the r.se of separate univariate analyses.
Indeed, the possibility that the defector would benefit from defection
and the non-de fee tors would successfully endure was possible*



